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This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible
control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose
an unobservable eﬀort level. A success in the ﬁrst stage makes eﬀort in the second stage more
eﬀective. Should one agent be in control in both stages (integration), or should diﬀerent agents
be in charge of the two actions (separation)? Both modes of organization can be explained on
the basis of incentive considerations due to moral hazard, without resorting to commitment
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11 Introduction
This paper studies a principal-agent model in which the principal decides how to organize a
project that consists of two stages. Should the principal employ the same agent to perform
both tasks (integration), or is it better to have diﬀerent agents in charge of the two stages
(separation)? The costs and beneﬁts of separating control that are highlighted in this paper
are solely based on incentive considerations due to moral hazard concerns. Both modes of
organization can thus be explained in a uniform framework without imposing any ad hoc
restrictions on the class of feasible contracts.
The two sequential tasks modelled here may e.g. be basic research and more applied
R&D activities. In practice, examples for both integration and separation abound. For
instance, Nicol (2000) emphasizes that at Bell Laboratories (the heart of R&D at Lucent
Technologies), they make a clear distinction between research and development. On the other
hand, Wahlster (2002) points out that in the German Research Center for Artiﬁcial Intelligence
(which works closely with Siemens AG to develop, e.g., the next Internet generation), the same
scientists carry out basic research as well as applied R&D and product transfer under one roof.
According to Royce (2002), who has managed large software engineering projects for Rational
Software Corp., the most discriminating characteristic of a successful software development
process is the separation between R&D activities and production activities.1
In many cases, a procurer deliberately commits at the outset to hire two separate contrac-
tors for distinct stages of a project. For example, the San Diego Association of Governments
carried out a congestion pricing project (allowing drivers of single occupant vehicles to pay
a toll in order to obtain access to the I-15 Express Lanes in San Diego County, California).
When a contractor was searched for Phase One (design of electronic toll collection technol-
ogy, interim implementation), it was already announced in the Request for Proposals that a
separate contractor would be selected for Phase Two (full implementation).2
1See also Johnson (1996), who argues in favor of a clear separation between research and development in
the context of software engineering.
2This case is well documented on the Internet, see <http://argo.sandag.org/fastrak/library.html>.N o t e
also that federal-aid highway program statutes generally require States to award separate contracts for highway
design and highway construction.
2The research question addressed here is closely related to the recent debate on public-
private partnerships. In this context, it is typically asked whether construction of a facility
such as a prison and service provision should be bundled. In other words, should the govern-
ment contract with one party to build and subsequently run the prison, or should it contract
with one party to build the prison and with another party to run it? This question has been
studied by Hart (2003) in an incomplete contracts setting, focused on the hold-up problem.
In contrast, the present paper explores the issue from a complete contracting perspective in
a pure moral hazard framework.
Speciﬁcally, consider the following two-stage game involving a principal and one or two
(identical) agents who have no initial resources. All parties are risk-neutral. At each stage,
an agent must choose an action (“eﬀort”) for which only control is contractible.3 In other
words, while the eﬀort level chosen by an agent is unobservable and hence non-contractible,
a contract can specify ex ante which agent is in control. In each stage, there can either be a
success or a failure, which is veriﬁable. To ﬁx ideas, assume that the principal is the user of an
innovation, and an agent is a research unit. The ﬁrst stage may aim at the development of a
new tool, that later on can be used in applied research and development (the second stage).4
Ultimately, the principal is only interested in the outcome of the second stage, namely whether
or not a product is developed that can be commercialized. However, a success in the ﬁrst
stage is assumed to make eﬀort in the second stage more eﬀective (either by decreasing the
costs of exerting eﬀort in the second stage or by increasing the productivity of second-stage
eﬀort).
Now the basic question is whether control should be allocated to the same agent in both
periods (integration), or whether control should be divided, so that one agent is in charge in
3In the terminology of Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (2001), the actions are “contractible control actions”.
While they also show that divided control can be optimal in a two-stage model, the logic underlying their work
is quite diﬀerent. In particular, they further depart from the standard moral hazard paradigm by assuming
that no output variables are veriﬁable.
4Hence, a two-stage version of Tirole’s (1999) “R&D game” in its complete contracting variant is studied
here. See Schmitz (2002b) for an adverse selection model of R&D with a related two-stage technology in
which the principal performed the ﬁrst task by herself. See also Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2003), who study a
two-stage R&D setting in an incomplete contracting framework.
3the ﬁrst stage and another agent is in charge in the second stage (separation). It is well-known
from the literature on task assignment problems that it may be beneﬁcial to let one agent do
several tasks, since the rent used to motivate an agent to work hard on one task can have a
spillover eﬀect on another task; i.e., integration may simply lead to “rent saving”.5 While this
force is also at work in the present setting, a novel eﬀect arises due to the sequential nature of
the problem studied here, where the amount of rents necessary to motivate the second-stage
eﬀort depends on the outcome of the ﬁrst stage. The fact that a success in the ﬁrst stage
makes eﬀort in the second stage more eﬀective means that the principal may have to oﬀer the
agent in the second stage a higher rent if the ﬁrst stage was a failure. But this implies that
under integration the agent may have an incentive to shirk in the ﬁrst stage, unless the second
stage rent in case of a ﬁrst stage success is increased over and above the level necessary to
motivate an agent to work hard under separation.
In order to see this more clearly, consider the simplest variant of the well-known hidden
action model with limited liability.6 A success yields a veriﬁable revenue of V to the principal,
while a failure yields no revenue. If the agent works hard the success probability is r, while
it is only q if he shirks, with 0 <q<r≤ 1. When the agent works hard, he incurs personal
disutility costs c. The principal oﬀers the agent a contract (w0,w 1) that speciﬁes payments
for the cases of failure and success, respectively. Since the agent’s decision whether or not to
shirk is unobservable, he only works hard if
rw1 +( 1− r)w0 − c ≥ qw1 +( 1− q)w0.
Given the fact that the agent has no wealth, the principal sets w0 =0and w1 = c/(r − q)
if she wants to induce high eﬀort, and w0 = w1 =0otherwise. The principal induces high
eﬀort whenever V ≥ rc/(r − q)2. In this case, the agent’s rent is qc/(r − q), w h i l ei ti sz e r o
otherwise.
5The fact that incentive considerations can lead to economies of scope has been shown in various frameworks,
see e.g. Baron and Besanko (1992), Dana (1993), Hirao (1994), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), Laux (2001), Che
and Yoo (2001), and Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, ch. 5).
6This model is a building block of many recent contributions to the moral hazard literature, see e.g. Innes
(1990), Crémer (1995), Pitchford (1998), Baliga and Sjöström (1998), Demougin and Fluet (1998), Tirole (1999,
2001), Winter (2001), Laux (2001), Che and Yoo (2001), and Laﬀont and Martimort (2002, ch. 4).
4The agent’s rent has interesting properties which to the best of my knowledge have so
far not been exploited in the literature. Speciﬁcally, the rent is increasing in the agent’s
costs, as long as the principal wants to induce the agent to work hard. Similarly, the rent
becomes larger when the eﬀect of eﬀort on the success probability is reduced. This observation
has important consequences when one considers sequential tasks with the natural property
that success in the ﬁrst stage makes eﬀort in the second stage more eﬀective (i.e., reduces c
or increases r). Assume that the stakes V are suﬃciently large so that the principal always
wants to implement high eﬀort in both stages. Under integration, the agent might be tempted
t os h i r ki nt h eﬁrst stage, in order to increase the rent he expects to receive when he works
hard in the second stage.7 Anticipating this temptation, the principal has to oﬀer higher rents
to the agent than she had to oﬀer two agents each in charge of one task, so that separation
is strictly optimal. On the other hand, if the stakes V are suﬃciently small, it is optimal for
the principal to implement high eﬀort in the second stage selectively, i.e. whenever the ﬁrst
stage was successful. In this case the principal strictly prefers integration, oﬀering the agent
a positive wage if and only if both stages are successful, which motivates him to work hard
in the second stage whenever the ﬁrst stage was a success. Separation is suboptimal in this
case, because the principal had to pay rents to both agents if both stages were a success.
The literature on task assignment and job design has several strands. Some authors such
as Dana (1993), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), and Severinov (1999) have taken an adverse
selection approach. More closely related to the present framework is the approach taken by
authors such as Holmström and Milgrom (1991), Itoh (1992), Hemmer (1995), and Che and
Yoo (2001), who focus on moral hazard problems. While the scale economies generated by
the “rent saving” eﬀect that can explain integration are a theme developed in that literature,
the basic insight of the present paper according to which in a sequential setting separation
can be explained without simply assuming technological diseconomies is new. Alternative
7This observation may be related to the “ratchet eﬀect” literature (a regulator infers from a high performance
an ability to repeat a similar performance in the future and becomes more demanding, so that a regulated ﬁrm
has an incentive to keep a low proﬁle; cf. Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993; Meyer, 1995). Yet, this literature assumes
either adverse selection or that productivity is initially unknown to everyone (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986,
and Holmström, 1999, on signal jamming and career concerns), and the driving force is noncommitment.
5explanations of separation that can be found in the literature make use of (several combina-
tions of) precontractual private information, acquisition of hidden information, productivity
parameters initially unknown to everyone, non-responsiveness to monetary incentives, limited
commitment abilities, and exogenous restrictions on the class of feasible contracts. For ex-
ample, Lewis and Sappington (1997) and Hirao (1994) assume that an agent acquires private
information in the ﬁr s ts t a g e ,w h i c hm a ym a k ei tc h e a p e rt ou s ead i ﬀerent agent in the second
stage.8 No such assumptions are made here, where in a complete contracting environment
the beneﬁts of divided control are based on the same kind of incentive considerations that can
account for its costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the basic two-stage
model is introduced. In Section 3, the costs and beneﬁts of integration and separation are
determined. Situations in which it is possible to condition second-stage control on the ﬁrst-
stage outcome are considered in Section 4. Further modiﬁcations and extensions regarding
diﬀerent eﬀort costs and renegotiation are explored in Section 5. Concluding remarks follow in
Section 6. All proofs have been relegated to Appendix A, while modiﬁed modeling assumptions
are considered in Appendix B.
2T h e b a s i c m o d e l
At some initial date 0, a principal P either proposes a contract to one agent A (integration)
or she oﬀers contracts to two agents, A and B (separation). In the basic model, it is assumed
that for technological reasons it must be decided at date 0 whether agent A or agent B will
be in charge of the second stage.9 All parties are risk neutral. There is no pre-contractual
private information (i.e., there is no adverse selection). The agents are identical, they have
no wealth, and their reservation utilities are given by zero. The principal is interested in the
production of an innovation, which has a value V> 0 to her.
8Aghion and Tirole (1997) combine information acquisition with non-responsiveness to monetary transfers,
while Riordan and Sappington (1987) combine it with adverse selection. Holmström and Milgrom (1991), Itoh
(1992, 1994), and Hemmer (1995) assume linear contracts and rely on risk aversion. Ickes and Samuelson
(1987) and Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) focus on the ratchet eﬀect and career concerns, respectively.
9This assumption will be further discussed and relaxed in Section 4.
6At date 1, the ﬁrst stage of production takes place (e.g., the development of a new tool).
This stage aims at producing a technology which — if employed — can increase the probability
of making the ﬁnal marketable innovation. Agent A can exert eﬀort e1 ∈ {0,1} by incurring
eﬀort costs c1e1, where c1 > 0. The agent’s decision whether or not to shirk is unobservable
(hidden action). The veriﬁable outcome of the ﬁrst production stage can either be good
(x1 =1 )o rb a d( x1 =0 ). It is good with probability pe1, where 0 <p<1.10
At date 2, the second stage of production takes place (e.g., search for an innovative product
that can be commercialized). This job is either performed by the same agent A (integration)
or by the other agent B (separation). The agent in charge can exert eﬀort e2 ∈ {0,1} by
incurring eﬀort costs c2e2, where c2 > 0. Eﬀort is again unobservable. Even if the agent
shirks, i.e. if he does not make use of the technology produced at date 1, the innovation is
still made with probability q, where 0 <q<1. However, if the agent exerts eﬀort, then the
probability of making the innovation is given by r>q .The value of r depends upon the
technology which he can use. If the outcome of the ﬁrst production stage was good, then the
probability of making the innovation is r = r1, while it is only r = r0 <r 1 ≤ 1 otherwise. Let
x2 indicate whether the innovation is made (x2 =1 )o rn o t( x2 =0 ). Finally, the principal’s
gross return Vx 2 can be veriﬁed and payments can be made.
In this paper no ad hoc restrictions on the class of contracts will be imposed; i.e., a
complete contracting (or mechanism design) approach is employed. Let wi
x1x2 ≥ 0 denote
t h ew a g et h a ta g e n ti ∈ {A,B} receives given that x1 ∈ {0,1} and x2 ∈ {0,1} are observed.
Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that at date 0 the principal proposes a contract








11).11 Let e =( e1,e 2(0),e 2(1)) denote
the eﬀort proﬁle which the principal wants to implement, where e2(x1) is the second-stage
eﬀort given the outcome x1 of the ﬁrst stage.12
10The assumption that the outcome of the ﬁrst stage is always bad if no eﬀort is exerted means that the
ﬁrst stage alone would not yield any rents to the agent. This assumption is only made in order to simplify the
exposition; a generalization to the case in which there may also be a success if the agent shirks is straightforward.
11It is well known that in a pure hidden action framework nothing could be gained if the agents were asked
to report their unobservable eﬀort levels. In contrast, incomplete contracting models usually assume that eﬀort
levels are unveriﬁable but observable, which means that they might be revealed using message games.
12Although eﬀort is hidden, one can argue that e is part of the contract. As usual, it is assumed that if an
7Since the agents are identical, in a ﬁrst-best world (i.e., if eﬀort were veriﬁa b l e )i tw o u l d
make no diﬀerence whether or not the same agent would be in charge in the two stages. Hence,
the costs as well as the beneﬁts of separation that are discussed in what follows are purely
based on incentive considerations. In order to simplify the exposition and avoid tedious case








In particular, the assumption guarantees that the principal will always want to implement
high eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage. It is obvious to see that the principal would be indiﬀerent between
separation and integration if (the value of the innovation were so small or the costs were so
high that) she preferred to implement low eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage.
3 Separation versus integration
Separation. Consider ﬁrst the case in which two diﬀerent agents are in charge of the two
production stages. Obviously, nothing could be gained by conditioning agent A’s wage on the







A is willing to exert high eﬀort (e1 =1 )if the following incentive compatibility constraint is
satisﬁed:
pwA
1 +( 1− p)wA
0 − c1 ≥ wA
0
If the outcome of the ﬁrst stage is good, then agent B is ready to exert high eﬀort (e2(1) = 1)
whenever
r1wB
11 +( 1− r1)wB
10 − c2 ≥ qwB
11 +( 1− q)wB
10.
Analogously, if the outcome of the ﬁrst stage is bad, then agent B is willing to work hard
(e2(0) = 1) whenever
r0wB
01 +( 1− r0)wB
00 − c2 ≥ qwB
01 +( 1− q)wB
00.
agent is indiﬀerent between shirking and working hard, then he follows what is prescribed by e.
13It is straightforward to analyze the cases in which Assumption 1 is not satisﬁed in analogy to what follows.
Yet, there are no additional economic insights to be gained from this analysis.
8Note that the agents’ participation constraints are automatically satisﬁed given incentive
compatibility and the limited liability constraints wA ≥ 0 and wB ≥ 0. The principal oﬀers
wage schemes in order to maximize her expected proﬁt
e1p
h





















Under the assumptions made, the principal will always implement high eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage.
Yet, it will depend upon the parameter constellation whether she wants to induce high eﬀort
in the second stage in any event or only selectively, i.e. whenever the ﬁrst stage was a success.
The following lemma characterizes the optimal contracts which the principal will propose in
each of these two situations.
Lemma 1. Consider the case of separation. If the principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,0,1),
then she will propose the contract wA
0 =0 ,w A
1 = c1/p to agent A and wB =( 0 ,0,0,c 2/(r1 − q))
to agent B, so that her expected proﬁti sg i v e nb y




If the principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,1,1), she will oﬀer wA
0 =0 ,w A
1 = c1/p and
wB =( 0 ,c 2/(r0 − q),0,c 2/(r1 − q)), and her expected proﬁti s









Proof. See Appendix A.
The optimal contracts simply correspond to the solution of the standard hidden action
model with limited liability. Note that if e =( 1 ,1,1), then agent B’s expected rent conditional
on a failure in the ﬁrst stage is qc2/(r0 −q), while it is only qc2/(r1 −q) conditional on a ﬁrst
stage success.
Integration. Assume now that a single agent, say agent A, is in charge of both production
stages. Suppose that the outcome of the ﬁrst stage of production is good. Then the agent is
9willing to exert high eﬀort in the second stage (e2(1) = 1) if
r1wA
11 +( 1− r1)wA
10 − c2 ≥ qwA
11 +( 1− q)wA
10.
Now assume a bad outcome of the ﬁrst stage. The agent then is ready to work hard in the
second stage (e2(0) = 1) if
r0wA
01 +( 1− r0)wA
00 − c2 ≥ qwA
01 +( 1− q)wA
00.



















01 +( 1− r0)wA
00 − c2
´
− (1 − e2(0))
³
qwA




Given these incentive compatibility constraints and the limited liability constraint wA ≥ 0,
the principal proposes a contract to the agent in order to maximize her expected proﬁt
e1p
h



















The following lemma describes contracts that are optimal for the principal, depending
upon whether she wants to implement high eﬀort in the second stage in any event (i.e.,
regardless of the outcome of the ﬁrst stage) or only conditional on a ﬁrst stage success.
Lemma 2. Consider the case of integration. If the principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,0,1),
she will propose the contract wA =( 0 ,0,0,c 2/(r1 − q)), so that her expected proﬁti s

















10and her expected proﬁti sg i v e nb y




Proof. See Appendix A.
Separation vs. integration. Suppose that the principal wants to implement high eﬀort
in the second stage selectively, i.e. whenever the ﬁrst stage was a success, e =( 1 ,0,1). If
two diﬀerent agents are in charge and if both stages are successful, each agent gets a strictly
positive wage (see Lemma 1). In contrast, if one agent is in charge in both stages, the principal
only needs to pay him the rent necessary to induce eﬀort in the second stage (see Lemma
2). The agent works hard in the ﬁrst stage just because otherwise he would lose the second-
stage rent.14 As a consequence, integration is optimal. Yet, if the principal wants to always
implement high eﬀort, e =( 1 ,1,1), this simple ‘rent saving’ intuition no longer holds true.
Recall that under separation the rent of agent B is larger if the ﬁrst stage was a failure. Hence,
if under integration the principal simply oﬀered the same rents for a second stage success as
under separation, the agent would not exert eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage. In order to induce eﬀort
in the ﬁrst stage in case of integration, the principal thus has to increase the wage that the
agent receives when both stages are successful, such that the agent’s expected rent when he
works hard in both stages equals his expected rent if he only works hard in the second stage,
qc2/(r0 − q). This means that inducing high second-stage eﬀort in any event (i.e., regardless
of the ﬁrst-stage outcome) is more expensive if only one agent is in charge, so that separation
is optimal.
It depends upon the project’s value whether or not the principal always wants to implement
high eﬀort in the second stage. Speciﬁcally, the following result can be obtained.













she prefers two diﬀerent agents to be in control of the two stages (separation). Otherwise, she
prefers one agent to be in charge in both stages (integration).
14Note that such a wage scheme is reminiscent of the literature on deferred compensation; see Lazear (1981)
and Akerlof and Katz (1989).
11Proof. See Appendix A.
Recall that the principal would be indiﬀerent between the two modes of organization if the
eﬀort levels were not hidden. Thus, the strict preferences for integration or separation derived
in the proposition are only based on incentive considerations due to moral hazard concerns.15
Collusion. Following the traditional mechanism design approach, so far it has been assumed
that the principal can rule out collusion between the agents.16 This assumption will now
be relaxed. Recall that the driving force behind the main result was the fact that under
integration an agent might be tempted to deliberately shirk in the ﬁrst stage in order to get
a higher rent in the second stage. Separation was a solution to this problem. However, if the
agents can collude, agent B might bribe agent A t os h i r ki nt h eﬁrst stage.
Assume that under separation, after having signed the contract oﬀered by the principal, the
agents can collude by writing a side contract with each other. Notice that the eﬀort decisions
are still hidden actions, so the side contract can only specify a payment tx1x2 that agent B
makes to agent A conditional on the outcomes x1 and x2. Following Tirole’s (1992) “leaky
bucket” model, it is assumed that while there is some unspeciﬁed mechanism that enforces
the side contract, this mechanism is costly to operate and thus only a fraction λ ∈ (0,1) of
the amount that agent B pays is actually received by agent A.
Remark 1. Suppose that the agents can collude. It is still true that the principal prefers


















Proof. See Appendix A.
In other words, while the cut-oﬀ value is now larger than in Proposition 1, qualitatively
15If V is strictly larger [smaller] than the cut-oﬀ level given in Proposition 1, the principal strictly prefers
separation [integration].
16There are good reasons to make such an assumption in a complete contracting framework. In principle,
if the agents sign a contract which says that they will not collude, the court should enforce this contract and
thus refuse to enforce any side payments.
12the main result is still valid.17 In the remainder of the paper, it will again be assumed that
the principal can prevent collusion.
4C o n d i t i o n a l c o n t r o l
So far it has been assumed that for technological reasons control over the second stage must
be assigned to agent A or to agent B ex ante (i.e., at date 0), and thus independent of the
outcome of the ﬁrst stage. For instance, this assumption is justiﬁed if the second task can
only be performed by an agent who is trained to do so, and training must occur before the
outcome of the ﬁrst stage, x1, is realized.18 It may be prohibitively costly to train both agents,
since e.g. training may require access to an asset which for technological reasons cannot be
given both agents simultaneously. As a consequence, it is then impossible to condition the
assignment of the second task on the realization of x1.
In contrast, in this section situations are considered where it is possible to determine
which agent is in charge in the second stage depending on the outcome of the ﬁrst stage.
Hence, contracts are now given by (wA,j 0,j 1)a n d( wB,j 0,j 1), where jx1 ∈ {A,B} indicates
whether agent A or agent B is in charge of the second stage, given x1 ∈ {0,1}. If the principal
wants to implement high eﬀort in the second stage selectively, i.e. whenever the ﬁrst stage was
successful, the results of the basic model continue to hold. However, if the principal wants to
implement high eﬀort in any event, she will now set j0 = B, j1 = A, so that agent B is in
charge in the second stage if and only if the ﬁrst stage was a failure.
Lemma 3. Assume that the principal can condition who is in charge in the second stage on
the outcome of the ﬁrst stage. If the principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,0,1), it is still
optimal to set j0 = j1 = A. If she wants to implement e =( 1 ,1,1), she sets j0 = B, j1 = A,
17Note that the case λ =0corresponds to the basic model, while in the case λ =1collusive bribes would
entail no eﬃciency loss, so that the principal would be indiﬀerent between separation and integration if she
wanted to implement e =( 1 ,1,1).
18For example, in the context of a project analyzing the Earth’s climate and radiation, NASA argued that
replacement of Space Applications Corp. of Vienna, VA, by another contractor would require intensive training
of new contract personnel, which would cause unacceptable delays to the mission. See Commerce Business,
Daily Issue of August 11, 1998.
13and wA =( 0 ,0,0,c 2/(r1 − q)),w B =( 0 ,c 2/(r0 − q),0,0), so that her expected proﬁti s










Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, if the ﬁrst stage was a success, the principal makes use of the well-known “rent
saving” eﬀect by rewarding A if and only if he is also successful in the second stage. Yet, if the
ﬁrst stage was a failure, the principal now pays A nothing and switches to agent B, so that
agent A can no longer have an incentive to shirk in the ﬁrst stage in order to enjoy a higher
rent in the second stage. Since this makes always inducing high eﬀort more attractive, the
relevant cut-oﬀ level of the project’s value below which integration is optimal is now smaller
than in the basic model.19
Proposition 2. Assume that the principal can condition who is in charge in the second stage
on the outcome of the ﬁrst stage. She will then prefer integration if the value of the project
is relatively small, V< r 0c2/(r0 − q)2. Otherwise, she prefers agent B to be in control in the
second stage if and only if the ﬁrst stage was a failure.
Proof. See Appendix A.
5M o d i ﬁcations and extensions
Diﬀerent costs. Until now it has been assumed that the costs of exerting eﬀort in the second
stage, c2, are the same for agent A and agent B. However, it might also be the case that agent
A’s costs are smaller, say because agent A has already gained some experience while working
on the ﬁrst task.20 Thus, suppose now that agent A’s and agent B’s second-stage eﬀort costs




O fc o u r s e ,i ft h ec o s t so fa g e n tB are very high, it is always in the principal’s interest to
let agent A be in charge in both stages. Yet, if the cost advantage of agent A is not too large,
19The fact that with sequential actions a switch of control in some states of the world can be optimal has
also been observed in the incomplete contracting literature, see e.g. Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998).
20T h ec a s ei nw h i c ha g e n tB’s second stage costs are smaller is less interesting, since this could only make
separation even more attractive.
14the eﬀect highlighted in this paper can be strong enough so that the principal may sometimes
still prefer separation, even though agent B’s costs are higher than agent A’s costs. However,
since cB
2 >c A
2 implies that separation becomes relatively more costly, the relevant cut-oﬀ level
of the project’s value below which the principal prefers integration will now be larger. More
precisely, the following result can be obtained.
Proposition 3. Assume that cA
2 <c B
2 .
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(1 − p)(r1 − q)
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.
Otherwise, the principal chooses integration.
(ii) Suppose that who is in charge in the second stage can be conditional on the outcome of
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Proposition 2 remains valid with the cut-oﬀ value r0cB
2 /(r0−q)2. Otherwise, it is optimal
for the principal to choose integration.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Renegotiation. So far, the costs and beneﬁts of integration have been explained without
imposing ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible contracts and on the parties’ commitment
abilities. Yet, whether or not it is reasonable to assume that the principal can commit not
to renegotiate is an issue about which economists disagree; see e.g. Tirole (1999) for a recent
discussion. Some readers may hence wonder if the results discussed here are qualitatively
15robust with regard to renegotiation. The purpose of this section is to show that this is indeed
the case.21
Consider ﬁrst the basic model in which for technological reasons the principal must decide
between separation and integration ex ante. The fact that the principal cannot commit not
to renegotiate means that she can no longer credibly threaten to implement a low eﬀort level
in the second stage when inducing a high eﬀort level will be in her date-2 interest. Recall
that in Section 3 the principal has implemented e =( 1 ,0,1) under integration. This is now
no longer possible if inducing e2(0) = 1 is suﬃciently proﬁtable for the principal at date 2. It
has already been shown that e =( 1 ,1,1) is cheaper to implement under separation. Hence,
the inability to rule out renegotiation can only make integration less attractive, so that the
cut-oﬀ level of the project’s value above which separation is optimal is now smaller than in
Proposition 1. Renegotiation thus only strengthens the main result.
Next, consider the variant of the model in which the principal can condition who is in
charge in the second stage on the outcome of the ﬁrst stage. In this case, even if the principal
can commit not to renegotiate, she only implements e =( 1 ,0,1) when it is also in her date-2
interest to do so. Recall that if at date 2 the principal wants to induce e2(0) = 1,i nt h i s
variant of the model she can simply do so by switching to agent B, so that agent A’s ﬁrst-stage
incentives are not diluted. As a consequence, there is no scope for renegotiation.
Proposition 4. Assume that the principal cannot commit not to renegotiate.
(i) Suppose that second-stage control must be assigned to an agent ex ante. Then Proposition
1 qualitatively remains valid, yet the relevant cut-oﬀ value is now given by r0c2/(r0−q)2.
(ii) Suppose that who is in charge in the second stage can be conditional on the outcome of
the ﬁrst stage. Then Proposition 2 remains valid.
Proof. See Appendix A.
21For concreteness, it is assumed here that it is the principal who can oﬀer new contracts at date 2. Yet,
this assumption is not crucial (in equilibrium, the principal oﬀers renegotiation-proof contracts at date 0, and
whether or not a contract is renegotiation-proof does not depend on how a date-2 renegotiation surplus would
be split). See also Schmitz (2005).
16Project choice. As an interesting application of Proposition 4(i), assume now that at date 0
the principal can choose between two alternative projects. For simplicity, suppose the only
diﬀerence between the two projects is that project 1 can generate a return V = V1, while
project 2 can generate V = V2.
Intuitively, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the principal will choose project 1 when-
ever V1 >V 2. After all, there is no state of the world in which project 2 can yield a higher
return than project 1.22 Nevertheless, the following result holds.
Corollary 1. Assume that the principal cannot commit not to renegotiate and that second-
stage control must be assigned to an agent ex ante. Suppose the principal can choose between
projects 1 and 2 with V1 >V 2. It is possible that she prefers to pursue project 2 if
V2 <
r0c2
(r0 − q)2 <V 1 <
r0c2
(r0 − q)2 +
c1
(1 − p)(r0 − q)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The reason for this somewhat surprising result is as follows. If the values that the projects
can generate are as characterized in the corollary, then under commitment the principal would
always choose integration (see Proposition 1). If renegotiation cannot be ruled out, however,
the principal will prefer separation in case of project 1, while renegotiation has no impact on
project 2 (see Proposition 4(i)). As a consequence, the principal’s expected proﬁt can then
be smaller if she chooses project 1. In other words, the principal might deliberately pursue
inferior projects as a commitment device.
Diﬀerent costs. Finally, consider again the case of diﬀerent costs (cB
2 >c A
2 ) as discussed
above, but now assume that renegotiation cannot be ruled out. If for technological reasons the
principal must decide between separation and integration ex ante, Proposition 3(i) still holds
qualitatively, but the relevant cut-oﬀ level of the project’s value below which the principal
prefers integration now is smaller. The reason is again that if at date 2 it is suﬃciently
22It is already known that (even under commitment) contractual parties may sometimes prefer a project
that yields a lower expected return (but a higher return in some states of the world), because a riskier project
can provide stronger incentives (cf. Schmitz, 2002a).
17proﬁtable for the principal to induce e2(0) = 1 under integration, then renegotiation would
take place and thus integration becomes less attractive.23
In the variant of the model in which the principal can condition who is in charge in the
second stage on the outcome of the ﬁrst stage, an interesting new problem arises. At ﬁrst
sight, one might guess that if the principal cannot commit not to renegotiate, agent B will
never be in charge. After all, even if the principal announces ex ante that she will switch
to agent B when the ﬁrst stage is a failure, she might change her mind once the ﬁrst stage
is completed. At this point in time, it seems to be in the interest of the principal to let
agent A be in charge in the second stage, because his costs are smaller. While this intuition
turns out to be valid in some circumstances, there are also situations in which renegotiation
has no bite. The reason is that due to the wealth constraint agent B must be promised a
strictly positive rent. When the principal wants to renege on the original contract and let
agent A be in charge although the ﬁrst stage was a failure, agent B must be compensated.
The cost advantage of agent A may be too small to cover this compensation.24 The following
proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 5. Assume that renegotiation cannot be ruled out and that cA
2 <c B
2 .





pq (r1 − r0)




Proposition 1 remains valid with the cut-oﬀ value r0cA
2 /(r0−q)2. Otherwise, it is optimal
for the principal to choose integration.
(ii) Suppose that who is in charge in the second stage can be conditional on the outcome of
23Moreover, note that separation can now be a valuable commitment device for the principal. Separation
may allow her to implement e2(0) = 0 even if this is not possible under integration, because renegotiating to





24The observation that the presence of wealth constraints (which are per se bad for the principal) can have a
beneﬁcial eﬀect by mitigating the danger of renegotiation has an interesting parallel to the work of Dewatripont
(1988). He argues that the presence of asymmetric information (which per se is also bad) can be beneﬁcial by
constraining the danger of renegotiation. In both cases, there are rents the presence of which makes ex post
renegotiation more diﬃcult to succeed, which is beneﬁcial from an ex ante point of view.
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Proposition 2 remains valid with the cut-oﬀ value r0cA
2 /(r0−q)2. Otherwise, the principal
chooses integration.
Proof. See Appendix A.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Should a principal have two stages of a project be in control of a single agent or should control
be divided between two separate agents? This question has been explored in a simple moral
hazard model with risk-neutral but cash-limited agents. While the principal may beneﬁt
from integration due to the “rent saving” eﬀect if the stakes are relatively small, she prefers
separation if the project can generate proﬁts that are suﬃciently large, so that high eﬀort
should be exerted in the second stage regardless of the outcome of the ﬁrst stage. Integration
is suboptimal in the latter case, because the agent would have an incentive to prejudice second
period eﬃciency in order to capture higher rents.
In the formal analysis it has been assumed that a good outcome of the ﬁrst stage makes
second-stage eﬀort more eﬀective by enhancing the additional success probability associated
with higher eﬀort. Alternatively, one might assume that a good outcome of the ﬁrst stage
reduces the second-stage eﬀort costs. In this case, we can expect qualitatively similar results,
as should be clear from the discussion in the introduction. Indeed, it is demonstrated in
Appendix B that a result in the spirit of Proposition 1 can also be obtained if r is ﬁxed and
c2 is reduced by a ﬁrst-stage success. All that really matters is the fact that the rent needed
to induce high eﬀort in the second stage may be increased by a bad outcome of the ﬁrst stage.
It should be noted that this is not an artifact of the binary eﬀort formulation. In order to
see this, observe that the rent would always be zero if eﬀort did not entail any disutility on
the agent. Thus, a positive rent when the eﬀort costs are positive means that there must be
situations in which increasing the agent’s eﬀort costs increases his rent.25
25Moreover, note that the assumption that only a binary signal is observed could also be relaxed along the
19Finally, note that costs and beneﬁts of integration have been explained here by incentive
considerations merely based on the established moral hazard paradigm. In contrast to models
of the hold-up problem in the incomplete contracting literature pioneered by Grossman and
Hart (1986), there was no need to restrict the class of contracts or assume that renegotiation
cannot be prevented.26 To be sure, the logic underlying the argument presented in this paper
does not depend upon whether the agents are employees within a ﬁrm or managers of diﬀerent
ﬁrms. One might argue that this is not a problem because similar organizational issues arise
within and between ﬁrms. Yet, the incomplete contracting literature has at least partly been
motivated by explaining the boundaries of the ﬁrm. It is however somewhat questionable
whether the existing hold-up models really have more to oﬀer in this regard. Recall that the
allocation of ownership in these models is also simply an allocation of control rights. In the
present model, the agent in control of a task has the right to decide about the eﬀort level.
Property rights arrangements can be explained with hold-up models such as Hart and Moore
(1999) as well as with models such as the present one if and only if the right to be in charge
of a certain action is connected to ownership of an asset. This connection so far has not been
addressed in the literature that aims at oﬀering a theoretical foundation for the incomplete
contracting approach and awaits further research.
lines of Demougin and Fluet (1998), who have shown that in a moral hazard setting with risk-neutral parties
all information that is relevant from a mechanism design perspective can be summarized in a binary statistic.
26Tirole (1999) has recently pointed out that standard complete contracting tools may have been too hastily
dismissed and he has already mentioned the possibility of considering multiple moral hazard models as an
alternative to the incomplete contracting approach.
20Appendix A
Proofs of Lemmas 1—3, Propositions 1—5, Remark 1, and Corollary 1 follow.






















Hence, the principal can always set wA
0 = wB
10 = wB
00 =0 . Her expected proﬁti st h u s
e1p
h














If the principal wants to implement e1 =1 , she sets wA
1 = c1/p (and otherwise she sets
wA
1 =0 ). Similarly, if she wants to implement e2(ξ)=1for ξ ∈ {0,1}, she sets wB
ξ1 =
c2/(rξ − q). The principal’s expected proﬁtg i v e ne =( 0 ,0,0) is qV, given e =( 0 ,1,0) it is
r0 [V − c2/(r0 − q)]. Note that if e1 =0then x1 =0 , so that e =( 0 ,0,1) and e =( 0 ,1,1)
are meaningless. Moreover, e =( 1 ,0,0) leads to an expected proﬁto fqV − c1 and is thus
dominated by e =( 0 ,0,0). If e =( 1 ,1,0), the expected proﬁti s




which is smaller than max{r0 [V − c2/(r0 − q)],qV}, so that e =( 1 ,1,0) is inferior to e =
(0,1,0) or e =( 0 ,0,0). Finally, the proﬁts in the remaining cases e =( 1 ,0,1) and e =( 1 ,1,1)
are as given in the Lemma. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .Note that the incentive compatibility constraints for the second stage are














21Assume that the principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,1,1). The incentive compatibility
constraint for the ﬁr s ts t a g ec a nt h e nb er e w r i t t e na sf o l l o w s :
³
r1wA












Subject to these constraints, the principal maximizes her expected proﬁt
[pr1 +( 1− p)r0]V − p
h
r1wA
11 +( 1− r1)wA
10
i
− (1 − p)
h
r0wA




Hence,27 it is optimal for the principal to set wA
00 =0 ,wA
01 = c2/(r0 − q),wA
10 =0 , and
wA


















Assume now that the principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,0,1), so that the ﬁrst stage
incentive compatibility constraint reads
³
r1wA












and her expected proﬁti s
[pr1 +( 1− p)q]V − p
h
r1wA
11 +( 1− r1)wA
10
i
− (1 − p)
h
qwA























Note that one can show analogously that the principal’s proﬁtw o u l db ee q u a lt o
[pq +( 1− p)r0]V − c1 −
pq +( 1− p)r0
r0 − q
c2
if she implemented e =( 1 ,1,0), which is again suboptimal, as is e =( 1 ,0,0).N o t ea l s ot h a t
the principal could achieve the same proﬁts as under separation if she wanted to implement
e1 =0 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. It has already been shown in the proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
that the only candidates for eﬀort proﬁles that the principal might want to implement are
27Note that only the expected payments are uniquely determined.
22e =( 1 ,1,1),e=( 1 ,0,1),e=( 0 ,1,0), and e =( 0 ,0,0). If the principal wants to implement
e =( 1 ,0,1), her expected proﬁt is strictly larger under integration than under separation,
since c1 > 0. If she wants to implement e =( 1 ,1,1), she strictly prefers separation, because














(r0 − q)(r1 − q)
c2 > 0.
Note that even under integration, e =( 1 ,1,1) leads to a larger surplus than e =( 0 ,1,0)
whenever V> c 1/[p(r1 − r0)], which is always the case given Assumption 1. The principal
prefers e =( 1 ,1,1) and separation over e =( 1 ,0,1) and integration whenever













which is equivalent to
V ≥
1




Finally, the principal will prefer e =( 1 ,0,1) over e =( 0 ,0,0) whenever [pr1 +( 1− p)q]V −
pr1c2/(r1−q) ≥ qV,or equivalently V ≥ r1c2/(r1−q)2, w h i c hi sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed by Assumption
1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Remark 1. Suppose that the principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,1,1) under separa-





10 =0 , and that she can set wA
11 = wA
10 = wA
1 without loss of generality. Given
collusion-proofness, the incentive compatibility conditions imply wA
1 ≥ c1/p, wB
01 ≥ c2/(r0−q)
and wB
11 ≥ c2/(r1 −q). It is obviously optimal for the principal to set wB
01 = c2/(r0 −q), since
a higher payment would only make collusion even more attractive. The agents can easily
agree on a side contract that induces agent A t os h i r kb ym a k i n gh i mp a yh i sw a g ewA
1 to
agent B whenever the ﬁrst stage is a success. Agent B is willing to pay t01 > 0 to agent
A (implying that agent B will shirk) as long as q[c2/(r0 − q) − t01] exceeds his no-collusion
expected payoﬀ pr1wB
11 +( 1− p)r0c2/(r0 − q) − c2. Agent A is willing to collude when λqt01
exceeds pwA
1 − c1, which he would expect in the absence of collusion. Thus, there is no room















23In order to rule out collusion, the principal can either increase wB
11 (such that agent B is no
longer better oﬀ if the ﬁrst stage fails) or increase wA
1 (such that agent A’s rent from working
hard is so large that agent B can no longer bribe him to shirk). The cheaper way to avoid
collusion is to increase wA
1 , because in order to match a one-unit increase in agent A’s rent,
agent B must pay 1/λ > 1 units to A. Therefore, wB







(r1 − q)(r0 − q)
c2,
so that the principal’s expected proﬁti s









which is still larger than the principal’s expected proﬁt when she implements e =( 1 ,1,1)
under integration. Note that e =( 0 ,1,0) and e =( 0 ,0,0) are still suboptimal. Thus, the


















Proof of Lemma 3. We already know the optimal wage schemes and the resulting expected
proﬁts for the cases jx1 ≡ A (integration) and jx1 ≡ B (separation). Suppose ﬁrst that the
principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,0,1). It is easy to see that (j0 = A,j1 = B) leads to
the same proﬁt as separation, while (j0 = B,j1 = A) leads to the same proﬁta si n t e g r a t i o n ,
so that the principal cannot gain from conditioning the assignment of who is in charge in
the second stage on the outcome of the ﬁrst stage. Suppose now that the principal wants to
implement e =( 1 ,1,1). Consider the case (j0 = B,j1 = A), so that agent B is in charge of the
second stage if and only if the ﬁrst stage was a failure. The incentive compatibility conditions








28Notice that if the principal wants to implement the eﬀort proﬁle e =( 1 ,0,1), she still strictly prefers
integration. She cannot simply replicate the integration outcome under separation by letting the agents collude.
In order to induce agent A to exert eﬀort, agent B must oﬀer a side payment t11 > 0 to A. But this means
that agent B would no longer have an incentive to work hard in the second stage if the principal only oﬀered
him w
A












11 =0 , so that the incentive
compatibility constraint for the ﬁrst stage reads
r1wA
11 +( 1− r1)wA
10 − c2 ≥
c1
p






















It is easy to see that it is optimal for her to set wB
01 = c2/(r0 − q) and wB
00 =0 . Moreover,
wA















10 =0 . The principal’s expected proﬁtt h u si s










which is larger than the expected proﬁt in case of separation. Finally, it is straightforward to
c h e c kt h a ti tc a n n o tb ep r o ﬁtable for the principal to set (j0 = A,j1 = B). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the principal’s expected proﬁt under
integration and e =( 1 ,0,1) is larger than the principal’s expected proﬁt under e =( 1 ,1,1)
and conditional separation if














which is equivalent to V< r 0c2/(r0 − q)2. It can be checked in a straightforward way that
e1 =0 ,e=( 1 ,0,0), and e =( 1 ,1,0) are still dominated by e =( 1 ,1,1) or e =( 1 ,0,1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Part (i). It has already been shown that assigning both stages to agent A i so p t i m a li ft h e
principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,0,1). Assume that the principal wants to implement
25e =( 1 ,1,1). In analogy to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it follows that the principal’s costs of











under separation and c1 + r0cA










then the principal still prefers separation if she wants to implement e =( 1 ,1,1). Her expected
proﬁts from implementing e =( 1 ,1,1) and e =( 1 ,0,1) are as given in Lemma 1 and Lemma
2w i t hc2 = cB
2 and c2 = cA
2 , respectively. The ﬁrst part of the proposition then follows
immediately.
Part (ii). In analogy to Lemma 3 it follows that the principal’s costs of implementing e =










Under integration, her costs are again c1+r0cA
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Otherwise, her expected proﬁt from implementing e =( 1 ,1,1) is









and her expected proﬁt from implementing e =( 1 ,0,1) is





so that the relevant cut-oﬀ value is as stated in the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Part (i). Note ﬁrst that the principal only has an incentive to propose a new contract at date
2 if the original contract induced e2(0) = 0, but V ≥ r0c2/(r0 − q)2, so that following x1 =0
the principal wants to implement high eﬀort in the second stage (cf. the simple one-shot
26model discussed in the introduction).29 Hence, e =( 1 ,0,1) and integration remain optimal
for V< r 0c2/(r0−q)2. Otherwise, e2(0) = e2(1) = 1.I nt h i sc a s e ,e =( 1 ,1,1) and separation
are optimal due to the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1.
Part (ii). From Proposition 2 it is known that e =( 1 ,0,1) is only implemented if V<
r0c2/(r0 − q)2, in which case the principal has no interest to induce e2(0) = 1. Otherwise,
already in Proposition 2 the principal induces e2(0) = e2(1) = 1, so that there is no scope for
renegotiation. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. Let V1 = r0c2/(r0 − q)2 + ε and V2 = r0c2/(r0 − q)2 − ε, where ε > 0
is small, such that the condition stated in the Corollary is satisﬁed. The principal’s expected
proﬁt from project 2 (with e =( 1 ,0,1) and integration) is then given by




while the expected proﬁt from project 1 (with e =( 1 ,1,1) and separation) is given by









If ε → 0, then a straightforward calculation shows that the expected proﬁt of project 2
converges to a number that is c1 units larger than the number to which the expected proﬁto f
project 1 converges. Hence, there are values V1 and V2 such that the principal prefers project
2 even though V1 >V 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.










because otherwise it is known from Proposition 3 that the principal will never prefer sepa-
ration. In analogy to the proof of Proposition 4, it follows that integration remains optimal
if V< r 0cA
2 /(r0 − q)2. If V ≥ r0cA
2 /(r0 − q)2, it remains to show that the principal will
29Note that if at date 0 the principal wants to implement e2(0) = 0, it still cannot be in her interest to oﬀer
in the original contract a positive wage following x1 =0 , because this would only strengthen her temptation
to renegotiate at date 2.




2 /(r0 − q)
i
, which is smaller than
































under the assumptions made. Hence, the principal will clearly choose separation if V ≥
r0cA
2 /(r0 − q)2. Whether she will then implement e =( 1 ,0,1) or e =( 1 ,1,1) depends upon
whether V is smaller or larger than r0cB
2 /(r0 − q)2.
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because otherwise the principal will always prefer integration (see the proof of Proposition
3). If V< r 0cA
2 /(r0 − q)2, integration again remains optimal. Otherwise, it is easy to show
that integration and e1 =0 , e2(0) = 1 must be dominated by e =( 1 ,1,1) and conditional
separation (j0 = B,j1 = A) under the assumptions made. Note that now it is no longer
possible to implement e =( 1 ,0,1) and separation, because the principal would let agent A
choose e2(0) = 1 at date 2. Thus, it remains to check whether e =( 1 ,1,1) and conditional
separation is implementable or if the principal will have an incentive to renegotiate to j0 = A.





. If x1 =0and the principal wants to renegotiate, she must pay agent B his
expected rent r0wB
01 − cB
2 and in order to induce agent A to work hard she will oﬀer him
wA
01 = cA
2 /(r0 − q). On the other hand, if she sticks to the original contractual arrangement,
her expected payment to agent B is r0wB




2 /(r0 − q) ≥ r0wB
01. Note that she cannot rule out renegotiation by increasing wB
01
since she must pay r0wB
01 to agent B anyway. Thus, the principal will not renegotiate if
cB
2 ≤ r0cA
2 /(r0−q). Otherwise, she will renegotiate so that she can only implement e =( 1 ,1,1)
at the costs derived in the analysis of integration. Q.E.D.
28Appendix B
First-stage outcome aﬀects second-stage eﬀort costs. Assume now that while a ﬁrst-
stage success has no impact on the second-stage success probability, it decreases the second-
stage eﬀort costs. Thus, r does not depend on x1, but now c2 = cH
2 if x1 =0and c2 = cL
2
if x1 =1 , where cH
2 >c L
2. In order to avoid tedious case distinctions, assume that V>
rcL







/(r − q), which ensures that the principal will
always implement high eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage. In analogy to Section 3 one can show the
following results.
First, consider separation. If the principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,0,1), she will oﬀer
the contract wA
0 =0 ,w A





to agent B, so
that her expected proﬁti sg i v e nb y





If the principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,1,1), she will propose wA
0 =0 ,w A




2 /(r − q),0,c L
2/(r − q)
´
, and her expected proﬁti s









Next, consider integration. If the principal wants to implement e =( 1 ,0,1), she will oﬀer





, so that her expected proﬁti s





















and her expected proﬁti s
rV − c1 − pcL
2 −




In analogy to Proposition 1, the following result can now be obtained. If the principal’s














29she chooses separation and implements e =( 1 ,1,1). Otherwise, she chooses integration and
implements e =( 1 ,0,1). Hence, the basic insight is robust with regard to the modiﬁed
modeling assumptions.
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